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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-3278
________________
GEORGE ESTRADA,
Appellant
vs.
TROY WILLIAMSON
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-00245)
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 5, 2007
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT and WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 11, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
George Estrada appeals from the order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Estrada, a federal prisoner who is incarcerated at the Allenwood
United States Penitentiary (“USP-Allenwood”), challenged the Bureau of Prison’s
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regulation prohibiting threatening another with bodily harm on the grounds that it was
void for vagueness. Estrada also alleged that the disciplinary proceedings held regarding
his violation of this regulation denied him due process. For the following reasons, we
will affirm the order of the District Court.
Upset about a job change, Estrada approached his female unit manager in
the prison dining hall during the noon meal. Estrada concedes that he addressed her with
a loud and boisterous tone of voice, and that each time he spoke to her he stepped towards
her direction. Estrada was told to settle down, and when he did not, he was escorted from
the dining hall to the Special Housing Unit. Estrada’s unit manager then wrote an
incident report charging Estrada with threatening another with bodily harm in violation of
Code 203. An investigation was initiated which included interviews with Estrada and a
prison employee who witnessed the incident. A Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”)
hearing was convened in March 2005. The UDC then referred the charges to the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for further proceedings.
A DHO hearing was convened in April 2005. DHO K. Bittenbender
determined that upon consideration of Estrada’s size, mannerisms, movements, and tone
of voice during the incident, Estrada had committed the prohibited act of threatening
another with bodily harm or any other offense in violation of Code 203. Estrada was
sanctioned to a thirty day term of disciplinary segregation, a one year loss of telephone
and visiting privileges, a twenty-one day loss of good conduct time and a sixty day loss of
non-vested good conduct time. Estrada filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
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U.S.C. § 2241 seeking reinstatement of his good conduct time and privileges. The
District Court denied his petition.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We
exercise plenary review of a district court’s legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding; any
factual determinations made by the district court will be upheld unless found to be clearly
erroneous. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 2005).
On appeal, Estrada does not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the
DHO’s decision was based upon “some evidence.” Rather, Estrada contends that he was
denied due process because: (1) Code 203 is unconstitutionally vague; and (2) his UDC
hearing was held a few days late.1 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District
Court’s order.
Estrada contends that Code 203 is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
Estrada was charged with violating Code 203, which prohibits threatening another with
bodily harm or any other offense. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. We have long
“reject[ed] the view that the degree of specificity required of [prison] regulations is as
strict in every instance as that required of ordinary criminal sanctions.” Meyers v.
Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 1974). “Prisoners, unlike free men, must well
know that they are considered potentially dangerous men and must expect to be highly
1

Estrada also argues that the investigation of the incident was inadequate,
the incident report was vague, and the disciplinary process was not impartial. Because
Estrada did not raise these arguments in the District Court, we decline to reach them here.
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regimented. In such cases the law requires less in the way of notice, and places a greater
burden on the individual to make inquiry or ask permission before acting.” Id. at 311
(quoting Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 655-56 (E.D. Va. 1971)). Given
Estrada’s status as a prisoner, his size, his admittedly loud and boisterous tone of voice,
and the fact that he continually stepped towards the female employee during the incident,
Estrada should have realized that his actions could constitute a violation of Code 203.
Estrada also contends that he was deprived of due process because his UDC
hearing was held six days late. Having carefully reviewed the District Court record, we
find no error in its decision to deny Estrada habeas corpus relief. The District Court
correctly determined that Estrada was afforded all of the process that he was due under
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing
Estrada’s habeas petition.
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